Football Finance

[dee]

Awaits news about the Etihad £200m a year sponsorship deal

I think that would not be 110%

 

[Beamrider]

Not sure how I missed this but Burnley are taking on Everton through the courts over Everton's breaching of PSR (which resulted in Burnley being relegated). Burnley would have been saved had Everton been docked the points in the season they committed the breaches. The original PSR decision effectively granted Burnley permission to take them on in court if they wanted to.
They're suing Everton for £50m.
Beyond this individual case, there could be an important precedent set here for 115/130 FC. Needless to say, I hope Burnley win, but I suspect they won't. I think they know that and were hoping Everton might settle out of court.
Being pragmatic about it, I don't think Burnley should win this one. Although I'd agree it would be fair if they did, I think the legal bar they will have to clear is too high - they'd need to show Everton benefitted from a sporting perspective to the extent that they (Everton) would have been relegated had they not spent like they did (too nebulous to prove) or else that the rules should have imposed the penalty retrospectively (which is a hard argument because, by becoming shareholders of the Premier League, Burnley effectively signed up to accept those rules as they were).
So I don't see them winning, which is not to say that a subsequent case against 115/130 FC wouldn't succeed, as in their case the sporting advantage argument will probably be easier to make (especially for a team that twice finished 1 point behind them). In that respect, the decision may be helpful to the bigger clubs as the reasoning of any decision will help them to build cases against City if they are penalised.

 

[tombrown]

So what is happening with 115/130FC, anyway? I thought we were told to expect a judgement towards the end of last season .. what is the hold up?

 

[Farkmaster]

So what is happening with 115/130FC, anyway? I thought we were told to expect a judgement towards the end of last season .. what is the hold up?

Lawyers guns and money.

 

[Squiggles]

Not sure how I missed this but Burnley are taking on Everton through the courts over Everton's breaching of PSR (which resulted in Burnley being relegated). Burnley would have been saved had Everton been docked the points in the season they committed the breaches. The original PSR decision effectively granted Burnley permission to take them on in court if they wanted to.
They're suing Everton for £50m.
Beyond this individual case, there could be an important precedent set here for 115/130 FC. Needless to say, I hope Burnley win, but I suspect they won't. I think they know that and were hoping Everton might settle out of court.
Being pragmatic about it, I don't think Burnley should win this one. Although I'd agree it would be fair if they did, I think the legal bar they will have to clear is too high - they'd need to show Everton benefitted from a sporting perspective to the extent that they (Everton) would have been relegated had they not spent like they did (too nebulous to prove) or else that the rules should have imposed the penalty retrospectively (which is a hard argument because, by becoming shareholders of the Premier League, Burnley effectively signed up to accept those rules as they were).
So I don't see them winning, which is not to say that a subsequent case against 115/130 FC wouldn't succeed, as in their case the sporting advantage argument will probably be easier to make (especially for a team that twice finished 1 point behind them). In that respect, the decision may be helpful to the bigger clubs as the reasoning of any decision will help them to build cases against City if they are penalised.

Surely these cases must be steering the game towards systems of real time accounting and monitoring?

It seems we're still living in an age where it makes more sense to overspend, beach rules and then try and defend yourself at a later date.

 

[Beamrider]

I'm torn on the delay on 115/130, but, perhaps because I'm optimistic, my inclination is to think that the longer the delay, the more likely it is that there'll be an adverse judgment for City. I think that way simply because if a decision came out that let them off the hook, the Premier League would be in part embarrassed to have failed to make the case, but also relieved to be able to tell the other clubs that they need to draw a line under it and move on. In that light, it would be easy for the panel to hand down a decision that let City off the hook, perhaps on a technicality as with the CAS decision.
But it would be harder to hand City their arses on a plate, and you'd want to make sure your decision was a tight as a gnat's backside. And that... would take time. I really hope that's what's going on.

 

[Beamrider]

Surely these cases must be steering the game towards systems of real time accounting and monitoring?

It seems we're still living in an age where it makes more sense to overspend, beach rules and then try and defend yourself at a later date.

One of the big issues we used to have when dealing with FSG is that they needed to do forecasts for US tax purposes. The Red Sox numbers were, apparently, really easy to forecast with little scope for error, but ours were a nightmare. Even down to the last day of the season, the result of the final games could mean £millions in terms of Premier League merit income, to say nothing of the difference between qualifying for Champions League / other comps / no Europe (affecting player bonuses and sponsor payments etc).
I think this is why UEFA went with December accounts - they can be filed earlier and it gives them time to sort any sanctions out ahead of the following season. The PL could potentially do that too. But I think the more likely outcome here is that Burnley lose their case and the system stays as it is. As harsh as that feels, I think it's the right outcome. The rules aren't perfect and they never will be, but you sign up to them, warts and all. As much as Burnley were unlucky, had Everton been relegated the season they were docked points, some other team would have got away with one. Shit happens.

 

[King Binny]

View: https://x.com/MoChatra/status/1968005034022687211

 

[737Max]

Man Utd announce record revenue despite poor form​

Image source,Getty Images
Image caption,
Manchester United's men's team are not competing in Europe this season
By
Simon Stone
Chief football news reporter

• • Published
    54 minutes ago

Manchester United earned record financial revenue of £666.5m last year despite the poor on-pitch performance of their men's team.

United finished 15th in the Premier League last season, their worst placing since the 1973-74 relegation campaign.

However, the start of their five-year front-of-shirt sponsorship deal with Snapdragon enabled them to post record commercial revenue of £333.3m, while matchday revenue was also a record at £160.3m in the year to 30 June 2025.

"To have generated record revenues during such a challenging year for the club demonstrates the resilience which is a hallmark of Manchester United," said chief executive Omar Berrada.

"As we settle into the 2025-26 season, we are working hard to improve the club in all areas."

Berrada did not reference United's poor start to the current campaign but says United are building "for the long term".

An overall loss of £33m represents a 70.8% reduction on the previous year, when the figure was £113.2m.

United say they "remain committed to, and in compliance with, both the Premier League's Profit and Sustainability Rules and Uefa's's Financial Fair Play Regulations".

In January Deloitte ranked United as having the fourth highest revenue in world football, based on the club's earnings of £651m from the previous year.

Real Madrid (£883m) were in first place, followed by Manchester City (£708m) and Paris St-Germain (£681m).

 

[Beamrider]

United haven't put their full accounts up yet, will probably be published in the next few days and I'll have a look at them in due course.

COMMENTS ON THEIR PRESS RELEASE IN CAPS BELOW

United finished 15th in the Premier League last season, their worst placing since the 1973-74 relegation campaign.

However, the start of their five-year front-of-shirt sponsorship deal with Snapdragon enabled them to post record commercial revenue of £333.3m, while matchday revenue was also a record at £160.3m in the year to 30 June 2025.

THE UPLIFT FROM SNAPDRAGON IS ONLY £10M OF THIS, THE REST IS DOWN TO AN E-COMMERCE PARTNERSHIP FOR WHICH THERE WILL ALSO BE SOME COSTS (IE REVENUE DOES NOT ALWAYS = PROFIT / CASH). I'VE POSTED BEFORE ABOUT THE STAGNATION IN THEIR COMMERCIAL GROWTH. OVER A 10-YEAR PERIOD TO 2025, THEY'VE GROWN COMMERCIAL REVENUE BY ABOUT 2.2% PER ANNUM. OVER 10 YEARS TO 2024 FOR US (I DON'T HAVE 2025 FIGURES YET), OUR GROWTH WAS 10.2% PER ANNUM. 10-YEAR GROWTH 24% FOR UNITED, 165% FOR US. WE HAD SOME CATCHING UP TO DO, AND IT'S DONE NOW. THE OTHER BIG CLUBS ARE CATCHING THEM TOO.

"To have generated record revenues during such a challenging year for the club demonstrates the resilience which is a hallmark of Manchester United," said chief executive Omar Berrada.

THE RECORD REVENUES WERE LESS THAN 1% HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR, ON THE BACK OF A RUN TO THE EUROPA FINAL, BECAUSE BROADCASTING WAS WAY OFF. NO CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, POOR MERIT INCOME FROM THE PREMIER LEAGUE.

"As we settle into the 2025-26 season, we are working hard to improve the club in all areas."

Berrada did not reference United's poor start to the current campaign but says United are building "for the long term".

An overall loss of £33m represents a 70.8% reduction on the previous year, when the figure was £113.2m.

LAST YEAR INCLUDED £47.8M OF ONE-OFF COSTS. STRIP THAT OUT, THE REDUCTION IS 52%. STILL NOT TOO SHABBY, TO BE FAIR. THAT'S BEEN LARGELY DONE VIA COST-CUTTING, MOSTLY WAGES.

United say they "remain committed to, and in compliance with, both the Premier League's Profit and Sustainability Rules and Uefa's's Financial Fair Play Regulations". I REMAIN SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS - I THINK THEY'VE DONE SOME DEALS WITH THE AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY THEY'RE NOT WORRYING ABOUT UEFA RULES THIS YEAR.

In January Deloitte ranked United as having the fourth highest revenue in world football, based on the club's earnings of £651m from the previous year.

Real Madrid (£883m) were in first place, followed by Manchester City (£708m) and Paris St-Germain (£681m).

AND THE BIT THEY DIDN'T HIGHLIGHT? THEIR BANK DEBT IS UP £130M ON LAST YEAR. NOW IT'S POSSIBLE THEY'RE SIMULTANEOUSLY SITTING ON A WEDGE OF CASH, SUCH THAT THEIR NET DEBT HASN'T GONE UP BY THAT MUCH - THE RELEASE DOESN'T SAY EITHER WAY. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE. THEY STILL HAVE A FURTHER £140M BANK DEBT THEY CAN CALL ON IF NEEDED, SO THEY'RE NOT GOING BUST IMMINENTLY, UNFORTUNATELY.

 

[Modo]

Too big to fail...they can just keep spending.

 

[Beamrider]

OK, a bit more detail on United's results. I've focused on cash flow and debt.
Debt
So the first thing is that their net debt has actually reduced compared to last year, which should be a good thing. BUT, £40m of that reduction is due to a change in the USD / GBP exchange rate, which basically shrinks the GBP value of the Glazers' debt (which is in USD). So they haven't actually repaid that amount, it's just that the cost of repaying it, should they choose to, is lower than it was last year because the dollar has weakened against the pound (which, obviously, will be Joe Biden's fault).
And the second point is that JimBob put in £80m of new share capital in the year.
So, on face value, their net debt has reduced by £93m, that reduction was not funded by improved trading, but by new money from a shareholder and a bit of luck in the wider economy.
Cash flow
So this takes into account cash out the door that doesn't hit results straight away (mainly spending on capital assets and players where the expenses are spread over several years for accounts purposes). Bear in mind that this is BEFORE their summer spending.
Cash flow BEFORE financing is negative £202m. They generated £72m from their trading operations but then blew a net £230m on players (£278m out, £48m in) and spent £45m on capital projects.
They then had to balance the books by drawing down £130m on their bank facilities plus Jim's £80m of shares.
Now, the fact that their net debt has gone down despite raising more debt is because they have some future receipts on the books that reduces their net debt, about £100m more than last year. I don't really know what that stuff is to be honest.
Summary
What this is all telling us is that, regardless of the positive spin on their results, they are still spending something like £100m more than their cash-flow break-even limit, once any timing issues have been ironed out. And if they continue to do that, they're going to need a bigger debt pile because they only have £140m left to play with in their bank facilities.
One easy way to manage this would have been to rein in their spending this summer, but in effect what they did was maintain their player payable balances at about the same level. The last instalment on their summer 2023 spend would have been paid and would drop out of the debt balance, but they spent broadly the same amount this summer as they did in 2023, meaning the debt balance should be about the same.
Which means, unless trading improves drastically this year, they're going to eat into that remaining £140m on their debt facilities over the next 12 months.
Which means sacking Ruben, which will be expensive, is a difficult decision, especially if the new manager then wants to do a squad overhaul, which he almost certainly will.
So what they need to do is curtail their spending on transfers and, ideally, raise some fees from sales. They will also need to renegotiate their bank facilities to a higher number and, gulp, ask the Glazers to put some cash in (not gonna happen).
@Modo is right, they are too big to fail, but the struggle goes on.

EDIT
Having given it a bit more thought, they may get closer to break-even this year as:
1. Their capital spend should be lower than last year (but they still have the spectre of refurbishing / patching-up Old Trafford hanging over them)
2. They won't have the redundancy costs in this year's numbers, plus they'll have a full-year of wage savings from that process
However, they could still have a chunky manager replacement bill.

 

[Beamrider]

A few other highlights:
£17m to sack Ten Hag and his team.
£20m on their redundancy programme - that's a lot of assumed dead wood. They lost a net 208 staff, of which 147 were admin and commercial.
Wages are down £50m, some of which will be redundancies, some of which will be player-related - not possible to tell.
I noted above that their commercial income has slowed over the last decade and I'm not sure how getting rid of a quarter of their commercial team is going to help that, but maybe there were too many people earning good money for sitting on their arses.
Retail and merchandising costs are up from £12m to £37m. Corresponding revenue is up £20m per their press release (which didn't mention the costs). So turnover up, profit down, although it's probably more nuanced than that (there may be some start-up costs in there).

 

[737Max]

OK, a bit more detail on United's results. I've focused on cash flow and debt.
Debt
So the first thing is that their net debt has actually reduced compared to last year, which should be a good thing. BUT, £40m of that reduction is due to a change in the USD / GBP exchange rate, which basically shrinks the GBP value of the Glazers' debt (which is in USD). So they haven't actually repaid that amount, it's just that the cost of repaying it, should they choose to, is lower than it was last year because the dollar has weakened against the pound (which, obviously, will be Joe Biden's fault).
And the second point is that JimBob put in £80m of new share capital in the year.
So, on face value, their net debt has reduced by £93m, that reduction was not funded by improved trading, but by new money from a shareholder and a bit of luck in the wider economy.
Cash flow
So this takes into account cash out the door that doesn't hit results straight away (mainly spending on capital assets and players where the expenses are spread over several years for accounts purposes). Bear in mind that this is BEFORE their summer spending.
Cash flow BEFORE financing is negative £202m. They generated £72m from their trading operations but then blew a net £230m on players (£278m out, £48m in) and spent £45m on capital projects.
They then had to balance the books by drawing down £130m on their bank facilities plus Jim's £80m of shares.
Now, the fact that their net debt has gone down despite raising more debt is because they have some future receipts on the books that reduces their net debt, about £100m more than last year. I don't really know what that stuff is to be honest.
Summary
What this is all telling us is that, regardless of the positive spin on their results, they are still spending something like £100m more than their cash-flow break-even limit, once any timing issues have been ironed out. And if they continue to do that, they're going to need a bigger debt pile because they only have £140m left to play with in their bank facilities.
One easy way to manage this would have been to rein in their spending this summer, but in effect what they did was maintain their player payable balances at about the same level. The last instalment on their summer 2023 spend would have been paid and would drop out of the debt balance, but they spent broadly the same amount this summer as they did in 2023, meaning the debt balance should be about the same.
Which means, unless trading improves drastically this year, they're going to eat into that remaining £140m on their debt facilities over the next 12 months.
Which means sacking Ruben, which will be expensive, is a difficult decision, especially if the new manager then wants to do a squad overhaul, which he almost certainly will.
So what they need to do is curtail their spending on transfers and, ideally, raise some fees from sales. They will also need to renegotiate their bank facilities to a higher number and, gulp, ask the Glazers to put some cash in (not gonna happen).
@Modo is right, they are too big to fail, but the struggle goes on.

EDIT
Having given it a bit more thought, they may get closer to break-even this year as:
1. Their capital spend should be lower than last year (but they still have the spectre of refurbishing / patching-up Old Trafford hanging over them)
2. They won't have the redundancy costs in this year's numbers, plus they'll have a full-year of wage savings from that process
However, they could still have a chunky manager replacement bill.

I hate that phrase 'too big to fail' Some of the biggest corporations in the world have gone under who thought they were too big to fail. And granted it's difficult to compare football clubs to businesses, yet that's what they are nowadays.

 

[737Max]

Man Utd owe more than £1bn after latest borrowing​

Image source,Getty Images
Image caption,
Manchester United invested heavily in new players over the summer
By
Simon Stone
Manchester United reporter

• • Published
    10 minutes ago

Manchester United took on an extra £105m of debt to help fund their summer transfer spending, taking the amount they now owe to almost £1.1bn.

United released club accounts up to 30 June 2025 on 17 September.

More detailed information was then released to the New York Stock Exchange on 18 September when the club outlined some of their business after the initial reporting date.

United say they spent £167.8m on new players after 30 June. They signed Bryan Mbeumo from Brentford on 21 July, Benjamin Sesko from RB Leipzig on 9 August and Senne Lammens from Royal Antwerp on 1 September. They had already signed Brazil forward Matheus Cunha from Wolves for £62.5m in June.

In the latest financial statement, the club confirmed their debt was £637m on 30 June 2025. This was made up of the historic senior secured notes and secured term loan facility which are a legacy of the Glazer takeover in 2005, plus revolving credit, which they have recently increased by £50m so £350m is available if required.

However, they also detail four additional drawdowns from the revolving credit facility between 7 July and 11 September totalling £105m, taking the sum accessed from this to £265m. This takes the debt to £742m.

This figure is increased when you add in the £447m United say they owe in transfer fees, £205m of which is due after one year. United also confirm they are owed £102.61m.

While staggering transfer fee payments over an extended period of time is now common practice across the Premier League, in total it means United now owe £1.087bn in various forms.

• Man Utd announce record revenue despite poor form
  • • Published
      1 day ago
  • • Published
      2 days ago

Minority shareholder Sir Jim Ratcliffe has implemented cost-cutting measures which in part led to a reduction in United's losses from £113.2m to £33m.

However, the lack of success on the pitch is hampering further improvement.

United made £43.7m from their run to last season's Europa League final.

This season, when they will have no European income, they expect their overall revenue to be between £640m and £660m.

Despite the new arrivals, Ruben Amorim's side have won just one game so far this season.

Ratcliffe flew to the club's Carrington training ground on Thursday for a series of pre-planned meetings, including one with the under-pressure head coach.

Sources have previously said the ownership remain supportive of Amorim, whose side play Chelsea in the Premier League at Old Trafford on Saturday, 20 September (17:30 BST).

 

[Beamrider]

Just to clarify re the above, these additional draws on their bank revolver facility would have left them with just £35m left in reserve. However, the accounts just released on their website note that they increased the limit by £50m after the year end (meaning they have drawn £265m out of £350m. So they've got a bit more breathing room, but it's still getting close to what I believe Ginsoak once called "squeaky bum time". One of the things I said they needed to do was expand this facility, but I thought they'd need more than an extra £50m.

 

[juniormember]

Man Utd announce record revenue despite poor form​

Image source,Getty Images
Image caption,
Manchester United's men's team are not competing in Europe this season
By
Simon Stone
Chief football news reporter

• • Published
    54 minutes ago

Manchester United earned record financial revenue of £666.5m last year despite the poor on-pitch performance of their men's team.

United finished 15th in the Premier League last season, their worst placing since the 1973-74 relegation campaign.

However, the start of their five-year front-of-shirt sponsorship deal with Snapdragon enabled them to post record commercial revenue of £333.3m, while matchday revenue was also a record at £160.3m in the year to 30 June 2025.

"To have generated record revenues during such a challenging year for the club demonstrates the resilience which is a hallmark of Manchester United," said chief executive Omar Berrada.

"As we settle into the 2025-26 season, we are working hard to improve the club in all areas."

Berrada did not reference United's poor start to the current campaign but says United are building "for the long term".

An overall loss of £33m represents a 70.8% reduction on the previous year, when the figure was £113.2m.

United say they "remain committed to, and in compliance with, both the Premier League's Profit and Sustainability Rules and Uefa's's Financial Fair Play Regulations".

In January Deloitte ranked United as having the fourth highest revenue in world football, based on the club's earnings of £651m from the previous year.

Real Madrid (£883m) were in first place, followed by Manchester City (£708m) and Paris St-Germain (£681m).

How the hell can a team playing in the French league be number 3 in the world for revenue? Considering what the two Spanish clubs plus the top EPL clubs earn from their respective domestic leagues, PSG must have even more fucked up commercial deals than City do.

 

[Beamrider]

How the hell can a team playing in the French league be number 3 in the world for revenue? Considering what the two Spanish clubs plus the top EPL clubs earn from their respective domestic leagues, PSG must have even more fucked up commercial deals than City do.

Commercial income on a par with City (LOL), broadcasting lower (obvs) but matchday (€170m) was bettered only by Madrid. And no, I've no idea where that number comes from, unless they do loads of summer concerts and other events, because the ground only takes about 47k people. Maybe they can also charge higher prices because they're the only top-tier team in Paris and demand exceeds supply.

 

[737Max]

The BookKeeper: Explaining Man Utd’s transfer spend, fees owed and growing debts despite cuts​

By Chris Weatherspoon
Sept. 19, 2025Updated 3:01 pm GMT+1
“These are all things from the past — whether we like it or not, we’ve inherited those things and have to sort it out.”

So said Manchester United owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe, speaking to the BBC six months ago. The target of his ire was transfer fees the club had signed up to before Ratcliffe bought into United in February 2024, but ones where payment instalments remained outstanding.

Advertisement

A month after Ratcliffe arrived, United’s net transfer debt — money owed to clubs on fees less amounts owed by others to United — sat at £271.1million. If that figure makes you squeamish, look away now.

United’s annual report for the 2024-25 season, published on Thursday evening, showed the club’s net transfer debt at the end of June was £344.5m — £73.4m and 27 per cent higher than when Ratcliffe and INEOS gained sporting control at Old Trafford. It is a huge sum and it does not even include United’s post-June transfer activity, when a further £92.1m net was spent.

What You Should Read Next

Manchester United finances explained: Record revenues but sixth annual loss
The club's 2024-25 results reveal that total revenues stood at £666.5m after significant increases in matchday and commercial income
Transfer debt is on the rise across football, particularly in the Premier League, where the quantum of club spending outstrips the ability to pay it off in one swoop. Pushing payments into the future is also generally advantageous — provided inflation doesn’t hit or dip below zero, the money in your pocket now is more valuable than it will be in the future as purchasing power diminishes.

Even so, United’s transfer debt is massive, sitting at 52 per cent of a revenue figure for which the club have already projected a £7m to £27m decline in 2025-26. The only Premier League clubs whose transfer debt to revenue figure exceeded that level at last check were Bournemouth, who redressed the balance with big sales this summer, Chelsea, who have received enormous owner funding to foot their bills (and we should note this is an estimate, as Chelsea don’t disclose transfer debt), and Tottenham Hotspur, who’ve had cash concerns of their own recently. United’s transfer debt is now the Premier League’s highest, based on known figures.



Ratcliffe bemoaned historic transfer wastage. This doesn’t mean they are now being frugal.

In his first full season at the helm in 2024-25, United committed £343.0m in player registration costs, a club record, primarily on new signings. In the summer, post-June, a further £167.8m was spent, taking fees on players since Ratcliffe’s arrival just 19 months ago to £510.8m. The vast majority of that comprised transfer fees and associated costs to bring in 10 new faces: Benjamin Sesko, Bryan Mbeumo, Matheus Cunha, Leny Yoro, Manuel Ugarte, Matthijs de Ligt, Joshua Zirkzee, Patrick Dorgu, Senne Lammens and Noussair Mazraoui.

Advertisement

Cuts to expenditure have been the off-field story of Ratcliffe’s tenure, and United’s wage bill has tumbled. At £313.3m last season, it ranks fifth in England against most recent figures for other clubs (all 2023-24), the lowest position United’s staff costs have dropped to since the Premier League was formed. That will help their future finances.

Improved player sales have been another help. United generated £69.8m primarily from the departures of Scott McTominay, Mason Greenwood and Aaron Wan-Bissaka. From July to September, they earned a further £75.7m by shipping off Alejandro Garnacho and Antony, alongside sell-on fees received via moves made by former players Anthony Elanga, Alvaro Carreras and Maxi Oyedele.

The BookKeeper: Explaining Man Utd’s transfer spend, fees owed and growing debts despite cuts​

By Chris Weatherspoon
Sept. 19, 2025Updated 3:01 pm GMT+1​

“These are all things from the past — whether we like it or not, we’ve inherited those things and have to sort it out.”​

So said Manchester United owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe, speaking to the BBC six months ago. The target of his ire was transfer fees the club had signed up to before Ratcliffe bought into United in February 2024, but ones where payment instalments remained outstanding.​

Advertisement​

A month after Ratcliffe arrived, United’s net transfer debt — money owed to clubs on fees less amounts owed by others to United — sat at £271.1million. If that figure makes you squeamish, look away now.​

United’s annual report for the 2024-25 season, published on Thursday evening, showed the club’s net transfer debt at the end of June was £344.5m — £73.4m and 27 per cent higher than when Ratcliffe and INEOS gained sporting control at Old Trafford. It is a huge sum and it does not even include United’s post-June transfer activity, when a further £92.1m net was spent.​

What You Should Read Next

Manchester United finances explained: Record revenues but sixth annual loss
The club's 2024-25 results reveal that total revenues stood at £666.5m after significant increases in matchday and commercial income

Transfer debt is on the rise across football, particularly in the Premier League, where the quantum of club spending outstrips the ability to pay it off in one swoop. Pushing payments into the future is also generally advantageous — provided inflation doesn’t hit or dip below zero, the money in your pocket now is more valuable than it will be in the future as purchasing power diminishes.​

Even so, United’s transfer debt is massive, sitting at 52 per cent of a revenue figure for which the club have already projected a £7m to £27m decline in 2025-26. The only Premier League clubs whose transfer debt to revenue figure exceeded that level at last check were Bournemouth, who redressed the balance with big sales this summer, Chelsea, who have received enormous owner funding to foot their bills (and we should note this is an estimate, as Chelsea don’t disclose transfer debt), and Tottenham Hotspur, who’ve had cash concerns of their own recently. United’s transfer debt is now the Premier League’s highest, based on known figures.​

Ratcliffe bemoaned historic transfer wastage. This doesn’t mean they are now being frugal.​

In his first full season at the helm in 2024-25, United committed £343.0m in player registration costs, a club record, primarily on new signings. In the summer, post-June, a further £167.8m was spent, taking fees on players since Ratcliffe’s arrival just 19 months ago to £510.8m. The vast majority of that comprised transfer fees and associated costs to bring in 10 new faces: Benjamin Sesko, Bryan Mbeumo, Matheus Cunha, Leny Yoro, Manuel Ugarte, Matthijs de Ligt, Joshua Zirkzee, Patrick Dorgu, Senne Lammens and Noussair Mazraoui.​

Advertisement​

Cuts to expenditure have been the off-field story of Ratcliffe’s tenure, and United’s wage bill has tumbled. At £313.3m last season, it ranks fifth in England against most recent figures for other clubs (all 2023-24), the lowest position United’s staff costs have dropped to since the Premier League was formed. That will help their future finances.​

Improved player sales have been another help. United generated £69.8m primarily from the departures of Scott McTominay, Mason Greenwood and Aaron Wan-Bissaka. From July to September, they earned a further £75.7m by shipping off Alejandro Garnacho and Antony, alongside sell-on fees received via moves made by former players Anthony Elanga, Alvaro Carreras and Maxi Oyedele.​

 

[737Max]

Part 2

Yet those improvements are from a low base and, relative to peers, not all that impressive. The £69.8m in sales last season would have only been the 10th highest mark in the division a year earlier, and was still dwarfed by United’s spending on new players. A net spend of £273.2m was another club record, the third-highest figure in English football history, and takes United’s 10-year net spend above £1.5billion. They would be less galling sums if they had translated to on-field success.

How they’re paying for it all is a good question. In January, The Athletic detailed United’s cash problems, even before another summer splurge. With that ongoing, in August, we reported on the possibility that further borrowing had been undertaken to help fund yet more transfer spending.

The latest annual report confirms it had. United’s revolving credit facilities (RCFs), held for years beforehand but never used until the rupture of the Covid-19 pandemic, are now being leaned on. RCFs are, effectively, corporate overdrafts which aid day-to-day liquidity.

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Since the end of June, United have consolidated their RCFs into one syndicate, extended the total facility from £50m to £350m, and loaned a further £105m on top of the £160m they had borrowed as at June 30. Up to a week ago, United had drawn down £265m on their short-term borrowing facility, a new high.

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Combined with long-term United States dollar-denominated debt that refuses to budge, it means United’s overall debt is close to the high watermark of 2009-10, when it topped out at £773.3m. When you include the £105m post-June drawdowns and reflect the latest exchange rate, United’s gross debt stands at £750.2m.

The debt is near an all-time high even after Ratcliffe injected £238m across 2024. Even with substantial funding from Ratcliffe and INEOS, United’s debt might actually be higher than the day they walked through the door.



And, of course, that debt drains resources. United’s interest charge across their $650m in senior debt and the fluctuating balance on the RCFs was £35.7m in 2024-25. Figures here aren’t exact, but rates on the long-term debt imply an interest charge across last season of £24m, meaning the short-term borrowings generated nearly £12m in finance costs.

A positive of consolidating the RCFs into one single fund is that it has brought the rate on that tranche of debt down a little. Two of United’s previous revolvers accumulated interest at the rate of SONIA (the Sterling Overnight Index Average, currently around four per cent) plus an applicable margin of 2.5 per cent. The single syndicate still accrues at the SONIA rate with a margin on top, but the maximum that margin can now hit is 1.75 per cent, and it can dip as low as 1.25 per cent.

Yet in real terms, the additional drawdowns mean United’s interest charge, at least from today’s vantage point with no repayments factored in, will increase this season. £265m in lending translates to £14m to £15m in interest on the short-term borrowings over the course of a year.



Interest payments at Old Trafford have long been normalised, but it’s worth highlighting just how great they are — and how they impact United’s business now more than ever.

Cash paid out to service loans is now at £853m since the Glazer family took over in 2005, a further £37.1m drain on liquidity last season. Twenty years ago, United had little trouble servicing the huge debts loaded onto them. The Glazers bought a debt-free club in rude financial health, one profitable at the operating level that could meet the payments, vast as they were, relatively comfortably.

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But those interest payments weigh rather more heavily. Big player spending and stagnating revenues have expunged profitability. Combine them with annual interest payments rising back toward the £40m mark, and it’s easy to see why there’s been a squeeze at Old Trafford.

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Not all of the cash troubles are driven by negatives. Unspoken until now are the substantial amounts paid out on infrastructure last season: £44.7m in cash, a shade below the previous four seasons combined, much of it on the Carrington training facility, opened in August, which had cost a total of £55.7m to the end of June.

Such investment, alongside those wage bill cuts, is a sign of a turning ship. Fixing the assorted wrongs of nearly 20 years will take longer than two. Yet Manchester United remain holed below the waterline and, in terms of debts both footballing and financial, improvements are yet to materialise.

 

[Beamrider]

Thanks for posting, it's a solid article and reflects what I've been seeing in the numbers.
A few points on it:
"United’s annual report for the 2024-25 season, published on Thursday evening, showed the club’s net transfer debt at the end of June was £344.5m — £73.4m and 27 per cent higher than when Ratcliffe and INEOS gained sporting control at Old Trafford." The increase is largely a function of them signing Cunha in the last financial year. If you take that deal out, their transfer debt is broadly static at 30/6/2025.
"Since the end of June, United have consolidated their RCFs into one syndicate, extended the total facility from £50m to £350m". This is incorrect. They increased the facility BY £50m, from £300m to £350m. The other figures are correct, and it's probably just the word "from" that the writer got wrong.

 

[Beamrider]

La Liga is nuts. I saw a story saying Barca have had their spending cap cut, reducing Rashford's chances of signing for them, and I thought I really needed to get a grip on how their rules work.
So I downloaded their regulations. All 251 pages of them (that's just the finance stuff). So nope, not gonna do that.
But their spending caps for this season... some highlights:
Real Madrid - €761m
Barcelona - €351m
Atletico - €327m
Villareal - €173m
Valencia - €91m
Sevilla - €22m
Those amounts have to cover the entire football payroll (including first team, reserves, youth, manager and key coaches) AND amortisation of transfer fees.
Barcelona, in 2nd place, are less than half Madrid's limit (they've lost €112m from their limit because, guess what, one of their clever financial schemes didn't actually work, and their auditors struck it out - fair play to them for having the bollocks to do so).
Sevilla on €22m!!!! No way that covers their costs.
Absolute lunacy. Sure, it'll prevent teams from going bust, but they don't stand a chance of competing with the top two, and frankly if Xabi can't win La Liga with that kind of advantage then he'll deserve the sacking that will inevitably come his way.
To hear teams complaining because the Premier League won't let them lose more than £105m when Sevilla, a multiple-times Europa League winner in recent times, can't spend more than €22m (much less lose that amount)???
Absolutely nuts.
And the complexity of their rules is madness. It would be so easy for a club to fail the rules because they filled in the spreadsheet incorrectly.
We've got it easy over here.

 

[peterhague]

It's amazing to me that we seem like the only league in Europe to actually give a toss about the most important thing - competitiveness.

Maybe we should care more than we do, but at least it's a *consideration*.

 

[the count]

A year on, Manchester City’s legal experts have the Premier League in a corner​

Barney Ronay




Happy one-year anniversary! How has it been? How do you feel? More, or less, in love? Have you counted down the days? Are you happier, wiser, more centred, like a man in a porridge advert going for a soulful morning run in a sunlit cul-de-sac?

Perhaps, to offer another perspective, you feel so viscerally nauseated at the prospect of leafing through the pre-planned partisan responses to a highly complex piece of legal wrangling there’s a danger your own intestines will liquefy and snort out of your nostrils straight into the toaster. Who knows? Maybe that was the point all along.


Either way, as of this week it is one year since the start of the Manchester City charges tribunal. Remember that old thing? The 115 charges, later upgraded to more than 130. Remember the sense of something urgent and real in train, but which already feels like a period piece, the kind of thing you might see on a clip-based nostalgia show, like Ocean Colour Scene or the Ebola virus?


A year is a long time in tribunal world, not least because if you follow football in any way you are ultimately paying for it. As such that anniversary probably deserves to be marked in some ceremonial sense, like the Torajan tribepeople in Indonesia who exhume their dead every year and dress them in new clothes, have a chat and pose for family photos. Perhaps we should be out there dusting off Lord Dyson or similar, sticking a cigarette between his lips, parading him about in a sedan chair.

Except, the Torajans don’t do this solely out of fondness or love, but also out of fear, reverence for the gods, anxiety over future rice harvests. And this feels about right for the Premier League at the end of its year of vast expense and gruelling mental fatigue, all of it shot through by now with the sense City have already won this process, in more ways than one.


This has by now become something of a joke on the football periphery. Why has it taken so long? The charges relate to financial reporting, employee remuneration and profitability and sustainability regulation. How hard can it be to resolve this?

Actually very hard, and this is normal. As someone with a professional insight into the process of corporate law, there is, to use a technical term, masses of complex bullshit to wade through. One semi-dead case at my old law firm had been going on for eight years, much of that time taken up dusting off files in a south-coast hangar and aggressively ranking local seafood restaurants.

But this is, of course, very far from a joke. By now that basic expanse of time is significant in itself. Time is money. Lots of time is lots of money. It has been estimated the Premier League’s bill for legal expenses over the past five years could be as high as £200m. The Nottingham Forest and Everton stuff has also happened. Chelsea are even now dealing with historical regulatory breaches under the ownership of an oligarch widely viewed as Kremlin-connected that, frankly, nobody could have foreseen and that’s all just fine.

It is also important to state explicitly that there is no evidence Manchester City have used complex litigation tactics to delay and wear down their opponents. Nobody has any cause to say this. There is a word for that tactic which is not, as far as anyone knows, in play here, and that term is lawfare, a practice familiar to rich and powerful entities faced with inconvenient regulation.

We know from defamation law what a Slapp suit is, also known as strategic litigation against public participation, described in the UK parliament as “a suite of litigious techniques, designed to intimidate, suppress and destroy” those in its path. Cases become endlessly complex. Related claims are submitted. Settlements are dangled, costs weaponised. You do want the pain to stop, don’t you?

This process has been identified by parliament as a threat to democracy, also known in some circles as “the tyranny of the majority”. Again there is no evidence City have any interest in this, or are doing anything other than defending their right to go about their business.

View image in fullscreen
A leaked email said Manchester City chair Khaldoon al-Mubarak ‘would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world to sue for the next 10 years’ than submit to Uefa’s financial prodding. Photograph: Andrew Yates/AP

Well, there’s only arms-length and disputed evidence, such as the leaked historical email from Simon Cliff, City’s legal kingpin, that suggested the club’s chair Khaldoon al-Mubarak “would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world to sue for the next 10 years” than submit to Uefa’s financial prodding. There was the unrelated comment in October 2024 that the league’s plan to update its rules rather than collapsing them was “an unwise course [which] would likely to lead to further legal proceedings with further legal costs”. Again. You do want it to stop, don’t you?

There is also the no doubt unintended consequences of City’s subsequent legal challenges to the associated party transaction rules, which both sides have claimed victory over, City despite failing on most of their points (again, this happens: just raise lots of points).

It was hard to understand exactly what the ultimate intention was here. The Lawyer magazine has noted City were “particularly eager for shareholder loans to be calculated retrospectively under the new rules”, despite having previously voted in favour of existing rules on that. This will now not happen. It would explain in part why the league feels it came out relatively unscathed, because this would have basically tied it in knots, a potential review of every loan to every club by every shareholder, a process that could have effectively collapsed its ability to function.

And this is all unsustainable in the long term. It’s a nightmare for the Premier League, which is not a legal entity but a light-entertainment production company whose rules are written in clear type, agreed to by everyone, and not really intended to be countered quite so aggressively. It’s a nightmare for its chief executive Richard Masters, who must have thought he was becoming a TV rights administrator, not a wartime prime minister. The clubs gave his predecessor a golden goodbye as a thank you. Masters’ key gift so far is a series of fraught legal briefings and, probably, an ulcer.



By now City and their world-class squad of legal experts have the Premier League in a corner, intentionally or not. Even if they are substantively punished, which increasingly just feels unlikely given the timeframe and the brilliance of City’s legal team, there remains the threat of an appeal. Come. Keep coming. Follow us into the plains towards Moscow. How deep are your coffers? How strong is your will?

Plus the past year has coincided with a general shift in the landscape, threats to boundaries and delivery systems, other mega-competitions mushrooming up. Do you really want to pursue and potentially discredit your eight-time champions like this? Is your product really so robust and discrete you can afford the consequences?

More widely this already feels like a victory for the dominant paradigm in every other part of modern life: a victory for billionaire culture, for the idea of rules as a suggestion for the powerless.

And also for populism, for hard power masked by obfuscation. There is something wretched about the hot-button shouting tagged to the legal process by City’s mouthpieces, a rag-bag of stuff about elites, cartels and victimisation of the overclass.

Chuck in the free-market libertarian nonsense, the “commercial freedom” ideas parroted around this issue by people who don’t understand what a free market is (clue: it’s not a government spending above market on its propaganda project. This is market distortion. This is the command economy, chaps).

But then, this is just a glimpse through the lens of the autocratic billionaire life. This is l’état c’est nous. It’s the opposite of sport, and of the flawed but necessary machinery of semi-regulated capitalism. It skirts around the essential, as-yet unprocessed question of why a government would want to own a football club in the first place.

By now the best outcome for English football as a business entity is probably a settlement and a fudge. In realpolitik terms, everyone just needs it to stop. There is a suspicion, unfounded in hard facts, that there has already been horse trading around this, which may or may not be possible given the basic notion of an independent tribunal.

What does seem certain is the outcome will not harm City’s project in any real sense, that the prospect of punishment has already lent it purpose and drive, binding adversity, conspiracy waffle, victim energy. Booing the overclass, raising your fists to the cartel, this is all deeply exhilarating. Twelve months on it is hard to see an outcome where even losing, nominally, technically, has any real meaning.

 

[dogboy]

A year on, Manchester City’s legal experts have the Premier League in a corner​

Barney Ronay




Happy one-year anniversary! How has it been? How do you feel? More, or less, in love? Have you counted down the days? Are you happier, wiser, more centred, like a man in a porridge advert going for a soulful morning run in a sunlit cul-de-sac?

Perhaps, to offer another perspective, you feel so viscerally nauseated at the prospect of leafing through the pre-planned partisan responses to a highly complex piece of legal wrangling there’s a danger your own intestines will liquefy and snort out of your nostrils straight into the toaster. Who knows? Maybe that was the point all along.


Either way, as of this week it is one year since the start of the Manchester City charges tribunal. Remember that old thing? The 115 charges, later upgraded to more than 130. Remember the sense of something urgent and real in train, but which already feels like a period piece, the kind of thing you might see on a clip-based nostalgia show, like Ocean Colour Scene or the Ebola virus?
A year is a long time in tribunal world, not least because if you follow football in any way you are ultimately paying for it. As such that anniversary probably deserves to be marked in some ceremonial sense, like the Torajan tribepeople in Indonesia who exhume their dead every year and dress them in new clothes, have a chat and pose for family photos. Perhaps we should be out there dusting off Lord Dyson or similar, sticking a cigarette between his lips, parading him about in a sedan chair.

Except, the Torajans don’t do this solely out of fondness or love, but also out of fear, reverence for the gods, anxiety over future rice harvests. And this feels about right for the Premier League at the end of its year of vast expense and gruelling mental fatigue, all of it shot through by now with the sense City have already won this process, in more ways than one.


This has by now become something of a joke on the football periphery. Why has it taken so long? The charges relate to financial reporting, employee remuneration and profitability and sustainability regulation. How hard can it be to resolve this?

Actually very hard, and this is normal. As someone with a professional insight into the process of corporate law, there is, to use a technical term, masses of complex bullshit to wade through. One semi-dead case at my old law firm had been going on for eight years, much of that time taken up dusting off files in a south-coast hangar and aggressively ranking local seafood restaurants.

But this is, of course, very far from a joke. By now that basic expanse of time is significant in itself. Time is money. Lots of time is lots of money. It has been estimated the Premier League’s bill for legal expenses over the past five years could be as high as £200m. The Nottingham Forest and Everton stuff has also happened. Chelsea are even now dealing with historical regulatory breaches under the ownership of an oligarch widely viewed as Kremlin-connected that, frankly, nobody could have foreseen and that’s all just fine.

It is also important to state explicitly that there is no evidence Manchester City have used complex litigation tactics to delay and wear down their opponents. Nobody has any cause to say this. There is a word for that tactic which is not, as far as anyone knows, in play here, and that term is lawfare, a practice familiar to rich and powerful entities faced with inconvenient regulation.

We know from defamation law what a Slapp suit is, also known as strategic litigation against public participation, described in the UK parliament as “a suite of litigious techniques, designed to intimidate, suppress and destroy” those in its path. Cases become endlessly complex. Related claims are submitted. Settlements are dangled, costs weaponised. You do want the pain to stop, don’t you?

This process has been identified by parliament as a threat to democracy, also known in some circles as “the tyranny of the majority”. Again there is no evidence City have any interest in this, or are doing anything other than defending their right to go about their business.

View image in fullscreen
A leaked email said Manchester City chair Khaldoon al-Mubarak ‘would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world to sue for the next 10 years’ than submit to Uefa’s financial prodding. Photograph: Andrew Yates/AP

Well, there’s only arms-length and disputed evidence, such as the leaked historical email from Simon Cliff, City’s legal kingpin, that suggested the club’s chair Khaldoon al-Mubarak “would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world to sue for the next 10 years” than submit to Uefa’s financial prodding. There was the unrelated comment in October 2024 that the league’s plan to update its rules rather than collapsing them was “an unwise course [which] would likely to lead to further legal proceedings with further legal costs”. Again. You do want it to stop, don’t you?

There is also the no doubt unintended consequences of City’s subsequent legal challenges to the associated party transaction rules, which both sides have claimed victory over, City despite failing on most of their points (again, this happens: just raise lots of points).

It was hard to understand exactly what the ultimate intention was here. The Lawyer magazine has noted City were “particularly eager for shareholder loans to be calculated retrospectively under the new rules”, despite having previously voted in favour of existing rules on that. This will now not happen. It would explain in part why the league feels it came out relatively unscathed, because this would have basically tied it in knots, a potential review of every loan to every club by every shareholder, a process that could have effectively collapsed its ability to function.

And this is all unsustainable in the long term. It’s a nightmare for the Premier League, which is not a legal entity but a light-entertainment production company whose rules are written in clear type, agreed to by everyone, and not really intended to be countered quite so aggressively. It’s a nightmare for its chief executive Richard Masters, who must have thought he was becoming a TV rights administrator, not a wartime prime minister. The clubs gave his predecessor a golden goodbye as a thank you. Masters’ key gift so far is a series of fraught legal briefings and, probably, an ulcer.



By now City and their world-class squad of legal experts have the Premier League in a corner, intentionally or not. Even if they are substantively punished, which increasingly just feels unlikely given the timeframe and the brilliance of City’s legal team, there remains the threat of an appeal. Come. Keep coming. Follow us into the plains towards Moscow. How deep are your coffers? How strong is your will?




More widely this already feels like a victory for the dominant paradigm in every other part of modern life: a victory for billionaire culture, for the idea of rules as a suggestion for the powerless.

And also for populism, for hard power masked by obfuscation. There is something wretched about the hot-button shouting tagged to the legal process by City’s mouthpieces, a rag-bag of stuff about elites, cartels and victimisation of the overclass.

Chuck in the free-market libertarian nonsense, the “commercial freedom” ideas parroted around this issue by people who don’t understand what a free market is (clue: it’s not a government spending above market on its propaganda project. This is market distortion. This is the command economy, chaps).

But then, this is just a glimpse through the lens of the autocratic billionaire life. This is l’état c’est nous. It’s the opposite of sport, and of the flawed but necessary machinery of semi-regulated capitalism. It skirts around the essential, as-yet unprocessed question of why a government would want to own a football club in the first place.

By now the best outcome for English football as a business entity is probably a settlement and a fudge. In realpolitik terms, everyone just needs it to stop. There is a suspicion, unfounded in hard facts, that there has already been horse trading around this, which may or may not be possible given the basic notion of an independent tribunal.

What does seem certain is the outcome will not harm City’s project in any real sense, that the prospect of punishment has already lent it purpose and drive, binding adversity, conspiracy waffle, victim energy. Booing the overclass, raising your fists to the cartel, this is all deeply exhilarating. Twelve months on it is hard to see an outcome where even losing, nominally, technically, has any real meaning.

Those photographs of the Indonesian tribes people's dead relatives are insane/amazing.

 

[737Max]

Leeds and Everton reached settlement over 2021-22 profit and sustainability rules breach​

By Beren Cross and Patrick Boyland
Sept. 23, 2025 7:54 pm GMT+1
Leeds United and Everton reached an out-of-court settlement in connection with the latter’s breach of profit and sustainability rules during the 2021-22 season earlier this year.

In November 2023, a Premier League independent commission found Everton guilty of the breach and the club later admitted it exceeded the permitted three-year losses of £105m by around £19.5m.

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Everton were deducted 10 points in November 2023, although it was later reduced to six on appeal. This penalty allowed Everton’s rivals to assess the earnings they may have lost as a result of this rule breach.

Burnley, who were relegated two places and four points behind Everton in 21-22, are in court with the Merseyside club to argue their case for lost earnings. Leeds, who were not relegated in 2022, but did finish one place and one point behind Everton in 17th, weighed up taking similar court action. Leicester City, Southampton and Nottingham Forest also initially indicated they would consider legal action.

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However, sources with knowledge of the case, who spoke anonymously to protect relationships, said the Leeds hierarchy did not believe their case was strong enough to go to court. Therefore, the two clubs reached an agreement earlier this year, which draws a line under the matter for good.

The financial package remains undisclosed, but according to the Premier League’s official table of merit payments for 21-22, 17th-place Leeds received £2,057,220 less than 16th-place Everton.

Everton also breached PSR rules in 2022-23, when Leeds were relegated. However, Leeds were two places back in 19th and could not argue they would have survived if Everton had either been punished (with a points deduction) or honoured the PSR rules.

Leeds and Everton declined to comment.

Leeds and Everton reached settlement over 2021-22 profit and sustainability rules breach​

By Beren Cross and Patrick Boyland
Sept. 23, 2025 7:54 pm GMT+1​

Leeds United and Everton reached an out-of-court settlement in connection with the latter’s breach of profit and sustainability rules during the 2021-22 season earlier this year.​

In November 2023, a Premier League independent commission found Everton guilty of the breach and the club later admitted it exceeded the permitted three-year losses of £105m by around £19.5m.​

Advertisement​

Everton were deducted 10 points in November 2023, although it was later reduced to six on appeal. This penalty allowed Everton’s rivals to assess the earnings they may have lost as a result of this rule breach.​

Burnley, who were relegated two places and four points behind Everton in 21-22, are in court with the Merseyside club to argue their case for lost earnings. Leeds, who were not relegated in 2022, but did finish one place and one point behind Everton in 17th, weighed up taking similar court action. Leicester City, Southampton and Nottingham Forest also initially indicated they would consider legal action.​

What You Should Read Next

Everton vs Burnley: Explaining the Premier League’s latest legal row and why it matters
What sparked the compensation row being heard in London today and why could it be so important?

However, sources with knowledge of the case, who spoke anonymously to protect relationships, said the Leeds hierarchy did not believe their case was strong enough to go to court. Therefore, the two clubs reached an agreement earlier this year, which draws a line under the matter for good.​

The financial package remains undisclosed, but according to the Premier League’s official table of merit payments for 21-22, 17th-place Leeds received £2,057,220 less than 16th-place Everton.​

Everton also breached PSR rules in 2022-23, when Leeds were relegated. However, Leeds were two places back in 19th and could not argue they would have survived if Everton had either been punished (with a points deduction) or honoured the PSR rules.​

Leeds and Everton declined to comment.​

 

[737Max]

The BookKeeper on Man United finances: Brutal cuts helped, but on-pitch results matter more than ever​

Manchester United's co-owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe has overseen cutbacks Oli Scarff/AFP via Getty Images
By Chris Weatherspoon
Oct. 8, 2025 5:10 am GMT+1

Manchester United still lead the way. Not in the manner they would like to, granted, but at least in terms of off-field timeliness.

Because they are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, United are required to be prompt in releasing financial information. Sure enough, the publication of their full 2024-25 accounts in mid-September was the swiftest among English clubs and across Europe’s elite.

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Some may scoff at United’s inclusion among the latter — they are absent from any of the three UEFA competitions this season — but financially, there’s little doubting their size. United booked club-record revenues of £666.5million last season, surpassing the £661.8m which landed them as the fourth-highest-earning club in world football a year earlier.

In spite of the positive top line, United were loss-making. Again. They sit on the other side of a sixth consecutive year in the red, with pre-tax losses totalling £397.4million in that time and debt closing in on an all-time high, even after over £200m in share injections by new co-owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe.

The juxtaposition with record turnover is stark. Twenty years on from the Glazers’ takeover, a year and a half into Ratcliffe’s quasi–reign, United’s finances are more intriguing than ever.

---

Breaking income records in a season where they were without Champions League football is noteworthy, but more impressive in isolation than in context. Compare United’s turnover to expectations elsewhere in the game, and the picture is rather less rosy.

Revenues are growing across football’s elite. Even in lieu of other clubs releasing last season’s financials, we know several are likely to have surpassed United’s top line. Liverpool are expected to have breached the £700million barrier, while it would be no surprise if Arsenal have gazumped United too. Abroad, Barcelona have overtaken them, and probably Bayern Munich too. If all four of those teams have done so, it would make United the eighth-highest-earning club; since consulting firm Deloitte began producing annual rankings of club revenues in 1997, they have never dropped below fifth.

Before the Covid-19 pandemic hit in the 2019-20 season, United’s revenue was £627.1million. In the six years since, income has only grown by £39.4m, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of just 1.02 per cent. Some growth is better than none, but other clubs have gained significant ground — Arsenal may have overhauled a revenue gap which sat at £231.6m in 2019.

 

[737Max]

PT 2

United’s problem is obvious: poor footballing performance is holding back broadcast income. Last year, they earned £173million from that revenue stream, their lowest since 2016, other than pandemic-impacted 2019-20. Liverpool earned more than that just from winning the Premier League.

The Anfield side also benefited from the generous new prize pot on offer in the Champions League, as did four other English clubs. This season, six English sides are doing so, and none of them are called Manchester United. One reason United were so keen to win May’s Europa League final was the financial boost of the spot in the Champions League that came with the trophy.

Broadcast income for 2024-25 would have been even lower were it not for United’s enduring appeal. Despite finishing 15th in the 20-team table, their £136.2million distribution from the Premier League was the division’s 11th highest, a byproduct of 28 of their 38 league games being televised live in the UK. Only Liverpool (30) and Arsenal (29) were shown more.

United were able to book record turnover because other revenue streams grew notably. Matchday income of £160.3million was a comfortable club (and English) record, up 17 per cent on 2023-24. Commercial income grew 10 per cent to £333.3m, an impressive year-on-year increase. Gate receipts surged. United’s run to the Europa League final helped them tot up 30 games at Old Trafford, five more than a season earlier. Naturally, that boosted ticket takings, as did “strong demand for our hospitality offering”, per the club’s results announcement.

Even so, the lack of Champions League football was an issue here, too. On a per-game basis, matchday revenue dropped from £5.5million to £5.3m. Still, recent price rises have clearly had their impact: last year’s per-game takings were 29 per cent higher than two seasons earlier.

Commercial growth was even more impressive. United remain a powerhouse, and £30.4million income growth was mainly attributable to improved retail and merchandise sales, up £19.7m (16 per cent) to £144.9m. The driver there was United’s new in-house e-commerce platform in partnership with SCAYLE, which launched 12 months ago. Growth in this area had stuttered to a standstill, so last season’s improvement was welcome.


More is expected in 2025-26: United have issued an overall revenue projection of £640million to £660m, which is a reduction, but not a huge one given there’s no European football at all this season, and so none of the matchday income that accompanies those extra games. They will doubtless have planned to improve their Premier League finish, but other lucrative undertakings are being considered too. United will have more midweeks spare than usual between now and May.

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Nowhere is Ratcliffe’s drive to slash costs clearer than in staff numbers.

Announcements since February 2024 indicate a total of up to 450 full-time United employees could depart, and 2024-25’s headcount was already down 208 on a year earlier. Given that’s an average figure and the redundancy program was ongoing across the season, a further drop is expected in 2025-26.

 

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Full-time staff reduced by 18 per cent, yet a comparison with United’s ‘Big Six’ rivals shows why Ratcliffe and company still feel there’s fat to trim. United’s 932 football and administrative staff last season was higher than the most recent average of the other five clubs.

The number of people United employ is crucial to understanding their total wage bill, which at £313.3million was down £51.5m (14 per cent) and at its lowest point since 2019-20. The reduction was born of both staffing cuts and the impact of no Champions League football last season, meaning player wages dropped.

United’s wages as a proportion of turnover figure has never been unhealthy, but after the pandemic it reached a record 66 per cent. Combined with other high costs and the impact of Covid-19, it meant their profitability cratered.

The club’s wages to revenue had averaged 49 per cent in the decade to the end of 2018-19. In the five years following, it averaged 59 per cent. Last season saw it tumble to 47 per cent, and United’s player wage bill gobbles up even less. Like most clubs, they don’t disclose wage splits, but a UEFA report in 2022-23 detailed player wage costs of around £217million. That meant £115m went on non-playing staff, more than the total salary costs at two of their Premier League rivals that year. With 635 administrative staff, United’s non-playing wage bill remained one of the league’s highest, even as it is dropping in line with restructuring.


That’s worth remembering when comparing wage bills with those elsewhere in the game.

At Manchester City, just 381 administrative staff were employed in 2023-24, yet their wage bill was £412.6million — £99.4m more than United’s most recent number. It means the gulf between the pair’s player salaries is even larger than a comparison of total staff costs suggests.

A falling wage bill is good for outgoings but might also create a new challenge. Spending alone won’t win you things, but pushing the boat out on wages does tend to increase your chances; the lower your bill there, the harder it is to compete on the pitch. And, as we’ve seen, poor performance equals less prize money.

Nobody expects Ruben Amorim’s side to win the Premier League this season, but if United are to return to the top of English football, they’ll need to either ramp player-wage spending back up or buck a decades-long trend. In the 33 years of the Premier League era, only one club have been crowned champions with a wage bill outside of that season’s top four payers: Leicester City in 2015-16.


Cost-cutting wasn’t limited to salaries. United’s other expenses (generally non-staff costs excluding depreciation) actually went up 14 per cent, to £170.4million — a club high and only behind neighbours City in England on latest available figures.

Peek under the hood, though, and you find clear impact from choices that have been made. Other expenses were up £21million but most cost categories showed a reduction, the main outlier being retail, merchandising and e-commerce costs. That new platform with SCAYLE wasn’t free to launch, and expenses were up £25.1m, suggesting initial costs were higher than the revenue boost. It seems likely that will reverse in future years.

Elsewhere, costs were down notably across travel and entertaining (36 per cent lower than 2023-24), legal and professional (20%), commercial and broadcasting (13%) and property expenses (8%). External matchday costs were up £4m (13%) but down proportionally, as United played 61 matches last season, an increase from 52 a year earlier. On a per-game basis, matchday expenses have dropped 9% in two seasons.

Of course, United’s efficiency drive would have been more successful were it not for two big missteps in the football department. Sacking manager Erik ten Hag and his backroom staff last October, then parting ways with sporting director Dan Ashworth a few weeks later meant £14.5million in exceptional costs, adding around 50 per cent to an operating loss which dropped by 48% otherwise.

If United choose to remove Amorim, Ten Hag’s successor, it will add to managerial change costs which now top £50million since Sir Alex Ferguson’s retirement 12 years ago. That figure is only a sliver of United’s turnover in that time but unwanted costs bear greater weight now than ever before.

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Less avoidable costs stymied United’s financial recovery and contributed to a pre-tax loss which, at £39.7million, was simultaneously a £91.1m (70 per cent) improvement on a year earlier and the club’s fourth-highest ever deficit. Exceptional costs relating to club-wide restructuring totalled £22.1m and, since Ratcliffe’s arrival, expenses incurred by the reduction of the wider workforce are at £34.4m and have naturally limited the speed at which United can return to profitability. Those costs will wane as the restructuring programme comes to an end, and United will benefit from savings in future years.

Already, the scale of cost-cutting has had a notable impact. United halved their operating loss to £30.5million, their best result in five years. Based on the most recent figures, this put them seventh in the Premier League, where almost all clubs lose money on the day-to-day, and player sales are increasingly relied upon to boost bottom lines.

On an EBITDA basis — earnings before the impact of interest, tax, depreciation and (principally player) amortisation — United’s £182.8million is close to the mark hit in pre-Covid times, and comfortably a league best.

No other Premier League club has ever topped that number, and it reflects United’s wage control and high revenues. Profitability struggles have come further down the chain, where significant transfer spending has shredded EBITDA, and the costs of servicing sizeable debts have only added to the load and contributed to six consecutive years of loss-making. It is worth saying, however, that United were in the red even before interest costs in each of the past five seasons, something which was not the case before 2020-21.

Profitability and sustainability rules (PSR) are on everyone’s lips nowadays, and for a time there were concerns United would run into trouble with the game’s financial regulations. As The Athletic detailed in June, though, the matter is more nuanced than previously known.

United’s PSR assessment is based on the results of Red Football Limited (RFL) rather than Manchester United plc. RFL’s pre-tax losses for 2022-23 and 2023-24 totalled just £55.1million, well below the Premier League’s £105m limit. Some add-backs around intra-group loan interest and exchange rate movements were applied for United’s PSR submission, but that level of loss, plus the sizeable deductions the club can make for expenditure on infrastructure, the academy, community and their women’s team, meant there was little fear of a breach.

The Athletic estimated United could have lost up to £141million in 2024-25 without breaching Premier League PSR. With just £39.7m pre-tax loss in the plc, before those expenditure deductions, there was little to worry about.

United are projecting similar Adjusted EBITDA (a proxy for operating performance) this season which, along with a few other factors, such as an expected reduction in exceptional restructuring costs, should mean any 2025-26 loss is reduced. As such, they shouldn’t have any PSR problems this time either.

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The cost-cutting at United has not touched transfer spending.

They spent £343million on player registrations in the year to June 30, a new single-year club record by almost £100m. A further £167.8m then went in the two months before the summer window closed on September 1 (Matheus Cunha’s fee was recorded within that £343m figure as he signed in June), taking gross transfer spend since Ratcliffe’s arrival to £510.8m. Only Chelsea and Liverpool have spent more in that time.

 

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Net transfer spending under his INEOS banner is at £365.3million. That jars with the cost-cutting rhetoric but makes clear the Ratcliffe camp’s belief that returning United to former footballing glories is key to fixing finances. United’s squad had cost £1.1bn to assemble by the end of June, the third most expensive in football at the time, and after deadline day that number is up to £1.2bn.

Transfer debt is on the rise across football, particularly in England, and The Athletic has already covered United’s ballooning transfer payables recently. Yet it’s still worth highlighting just how big their transfer debt is: at a net £344.5million, it is likely the highest in world football.

What’s more, £182.8million is payable before the end of June 2026, meaning pressure on United’s cash flow is unlikely to ease in the short term. They drew down a further £105m on their revolving credit facility (RCF) — effectively, a corporate overdraft which aids day-to-day liquidity — between July and September, in part to help meet such large transfer liabilities.


One way to reduce transfer debt and improve finances more broadly is to be better sellers in the market.

United have been poor at moving players on for good money, a byproduct of spending big on individuals who have then not hit expectations at Old Trafford. Other clubs have embraced player trading as a key strand of their business model. In the decade to 2023-24, United made £174.2million profit on player sales, only the 18th highest in England, £400m behind City and over £650m behind Chelsea.

There are signs of change, though. Much of the narrative over the summer was about United making some money from sales, and they did eventually find buyers for Alejandro Garnacho and Antony. Combined with over £20million in fees due from moves by former United players, as with Anthony Elanga’s switch to Newcastle from Nottingham Forest, the club have generated £75.7m in sales in 2025-26, £44m as profit. Further activity could push them past the single-season £83.7million sales record set when Cristiano Ronaldo moved to Real Madrid in June 2009.

Better sales at United are both a positive and needed, but they still struggle relative to their peers. Eight Premier League clubs surpassed £100million in player sales this summer.

The improvement in player sales is also tinged with a reminder of past failings.

United’s accounts disclosed £55.4million received for players with a net book value of £31.7m at the time of sale. The bulk of that related to Antony, who was signed for over £80m three years ago. Getting him off the books to Real Betis was a success this summer but United clearly took not only a big haircut on the fee paid for him, but one so large it generated an accounting loss too.

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The time it takes for cost-cutting to be fully realised, alongside continued big transfer spending, means United’s debt is near its highest ever point.

Debt-free before the Glazers arrived, the club’s financial debt topped out at £773.3million in both June 2010 and December 2023.

The figure was £637million at the end of June this year, but events since have pushed it higher. Those combined £105m drawdowns on the RCF, alongside United’s unmoving $650m (£484m at the current rate) in long-term debt, put current estimates for total debt above £750m. The RCF, for a long time unused, was extended further in July. United now have £350m in short-term borrowing capabilities, of which £265m has been utilised.

That such borrowing was needed even after Ratcliffe injected £238.5million in shares last year is indicative of United’s outgoings.

While we await the latest accounts from most teams, £750million-plus of financial debt pitches United as one of the most indebted clubs in world football. Ahead of them are Barcelona, Real Madrid, Tottenham and Everton, but spot the common theme there. Each of those four either has a new stadium or an old one that’s been/is being hugely and expensively revamped to be best in class; United, currently, have neither.

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At the end of 2018-19, United had £307.6million in cash. Six years later, the balance has dwindled to £86.1m, and that’s less than half the short-term transfer debt. United’s existing reserves weren’t enough to fund activities since the end of the previous decade.

Over the past six seasons, the club has received £390.3million in external funding: that £238.5m in shares from Ratcliffe, and a further net £151.8m in loans from banks. The up-to-date amount is £495.3m, as the above doesn’t include the further £105m pulled down on the RCF.

All of that has been required even as United continue to make huge sums on a day-to-day basis. In 15 of the past 17 seasons, over £100million cash has been generated from operations. Across the past six seasons, cash from operations totalled £620.9m.

United’s problem is that their outgoings have been far larger. Across operating activities, Ratcliffe’s equity injections, added loans and a sliver from positive exchange rate movements, they’ve recorded incoming cash since June 2019 of £1.021billion. But outgoing cash was £1.243billion. Part of that, as ever, stems from the Glazers’ takeover in 2005. Across interest paid on loans and dividends paid out to shareholders (principally a certain family whose name rhymes with razor), £230million left the coffers in the past six years. A further £21.3m went on a share buyback in 2019-20.

That still only counts for a fifth of the outgoing cash in that time, though. Far more draining has been United’s transfer activity. Some £877.1m, net, went on fees, the most by any English club other than Chelsea (£1.218bn). United’s transfer splurging has plainly contributed to the financial situation they’re in, but it’s the convergence of that and declining on-field performance which has pushed them to where they are today.

Their free cash flow (FCF), the amount left over after capital expenditure (things like transfer fees) and interest costs, was over £200million in the red last season, not far shy of its pandemic nadir. That neatly summarises why £130m of added RCF borrowings and Ratcliffe’s final £80m equity injection were needed.